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Democratic Decline and the 
Politics of the Upswing: How 
the United States May Have 
Come Together a Century  
Ago but Can It Do It Again?
Matthew Flinders
Abstract
Robert Putman’s The Upswing (written with Shaylyn Romney Garrett) provides a powerful meta-
analysis of American social, political, economic and cultural change throughout the twentieth 
century. What this analysis reveals is the existence of an almost perfect arc of social progress 
which begins from a low position around the Gilded Age at the beginning of the twentieth century 
and then climbs across all variables until reaching a highpoint around 1960. The Progressive Era, 
Putnam argues, engineered an ‘upswing’ against inequality, polarisation, social disarray and a 
culture of self-centredness. Since then, however, the data suggest that a severe downswing has 
occurred which explains the existence of deep divisions and polarised politics in the United States. 
Putnam’s core argument is simple: The United States has pulled itself out of a trough before and 
it can do it again. In a post-Trump context, this argument could hardly be more welcome which 
may explain the rave reviews this book has generally received. Nevertheless, the core weakness 
of The Upswing is that it arguably tells us far more about how the United States ‘came together a 
century ago’ but far less about how it ‘can do it again’ in the future.
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The United States is a deeply divided and troubled democracy. The Trump Presidency and 
the impact of COVID has only deepened divides and laid bare the existence of embedded 
structural inequalities. In this context, Robert Putnam’s latest book Upswing (written with 
Shaylyn Romney Garrett) has arguably been published with impeccable timing. The 
United States is, as one review of this book puts it, ‘yearning for an Upswing’ (Kahloon, 
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2020). With this in mind, it is difficult to think of anyone in the world more suited to iden-
tify a route map or blueprint for reversing a downwards spiral of civic apathy. Putnam’s 
name has become almost synonymous with the analysis of social capital. For four decades, 
his books have charted civic decline, eroding trust and social division. The Upswing can-
not therefore be understood on its own but is best seen as the culmination of a lifetime’s 
scholarship that has evolved from – to note just a few of his books – Hanging Together 
(with Nicholas Bayne, 1984) through to Making Democracy Work (1993), Bowling Alone 
(2000), Democracies in Flux (2002), Better Together (with Lewis M. Feldstein, 2003), 
American Grace (with David Campbell) and Our Kids (2015). The standard of this schol-
arship and the scale of its contribution to the design of public policy have been acknowl-
edged in a great raft of prizes, awards and honorary degrees. In 2013, he was personally 
awarded the National Humanities Medal by President Obama for ‘deepening our under-
standing of community in America’ (The White House, 2013).
Obama’s experience not just as a politician but more importantly as a former commu-
nity activist in Chicago would have undoubtedly resonated with Putnam’s emphasis on 
social solidarity and collective endeavour. ‘This was true democracy at work’, Obama 
(2020: 11) writes about social movements where ordinary people came together to make 
change:
democracy not as a gift from on high, or of a division of spoils between interest groups, but 
rather democracy that was earned, the work of everybody. The result was not just a change in 
material conditions but a sense of dignity for people and communities, a bond between those 
who had once seemed far apart.
This focus on social bonds and trust that Putnam has consistently explored is not, how-
ever, the sole reason for his success. What has also marked-out Putnam’s scholarship has 
been a very particular and relatively rare form of solution-orientated political science. As 
Gerry Stoker (2013) has argued, how to actually solve pressing socio-political challenges 
has in recent decades become a neglected justification for political science. Even the most 
cursory analysis of the vast body of scholarship which has in recent years attempted to 
trace the ‘end’, ‘death’, ‘decline’, ‘suicide’, ‘crisis’, or ‘twilight’ of democracy reveals a 
predominantly problem-orientated approach.1 As a result, readers of this corpus will be 
left knowing a huge amount about the problems or challenges faced by democratic gov-
ernance but far less about what might be done to address them. Putnam, by contrast, has 
always undertaken his research as a precursor to dealing with the far thornier questions 
concerning what can be done.2
This emphasis on ‘what can be done’ leads me not to the beginning but the end of 
Putnam’s Upswing and, more specifically, to the acknowledgments and the admission 
that
This book has a slightly unusual history. While tinkering with several obscure datasets – his 
favorite pastime – Robert Putnam stumbled over an unexpected confluence of historical patterns, 
tempting him into reneging on a promise to his long-supportive wife, Rosemary, that Our Kids 
(2015) would be his last book. (p. 343)
Tinkering with obscure datasets is undoubtedly a niche pastime but, as many scholars and 
writers will know, such structured serendipity is the perfect strategy for grappling with 
complexity. And yet, the problem with Putnam’s Upswing is that it is arguably too heavy 
on ‘How we [American society] came together in the past’ and far too light on the thornier 
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question of ‘How we can do it again’ in the future. Given that this latter element of the 
book’s sub-title provides the raison d’être of The Upswing, and in light of the already 
mentioned solution-orientated approach that has been the hallmark of Putnam’s career, 
this critical claim demands explanation.
This ‘past-heavy, future-lite’ claim is presented through a three-part process of review 
and discussion. The first part provides a precis of The Upswing with a focus on the core 
thesis regarding the ‘I’-‘We’-‘I’ arc. The second section questions the core assumption 
that it is in history that clues regarding the creation of a blueprint for civic and national 
renewal can be found. Although adopting such a doubtful disposition is the academic 
equivalent of sitting ‘outside the whale’ given the admiration and acclaim The Upswing 
has already received, an outsider’s perspective often yields fresh insights (discussed 
below). It is this book’s belief that the challenges of the past are in any meaningful way 
relevant to the challenges of today, and its belief that the social foundations of a civic 
revival can be identified within contemporary American politics that provide the fault line 
which this article seeks to explore. The storms of the past, it will be argued, are very dif-
ferent to the storms of today. This leads into a focus not on the balance between the indi-
vidual and community (i.e. the explicit spine of this book) but on the balance between 
idealism and realism (i.e. the implicit but possibly more enlightening aspect of this book 
– its deeper story). Putnam’s book is full of belief and hope but if an upswing is going to 
occur, its architects and leaders will have to pit themselves against the gritty realities of 
American life. In order to tease this argument out the final section draws-upon Barack 
Obama’s presidential memoirs and specifically the notion of being ‘Inside the Barrel’.
The ‘I’-‘We’-‘I’ arc of the twentieth century
The Upswing opens with a first-line focus on Alexis de Tocqueville’s travels around the 
United States in the 1830s. It was at this time a newly formed nation but de Tocqueville 
made observations and revealed insights – Putnam (2019: 1) suggests – that ‘only an 
outsider’s perspective could yield’. Central among his observations was a realisation that 
the United States possessed a distinctive civic culture. On one hand, the  men and women 
he watched and listened to had a fierce commitment to personal liberty and a pioneering 
spirit which bristled against external interference; and yet, on the other hand, he observed 
the coming together and mutual support that these people offered each other and it was 
this sense of civic action and civic responsibility which formed a strong counter-balance 
to rampant individualism. This is, of course, and as Putnam acknowledges, a fairly rosy 
interpretation of history which conveniently overlooks the genocide of Native Americans, 
the enslavement of African Americans and the disenfranchisement of women. But the 
core social dimension that de Tocqueville first identifies and which then runs like a golden 
thread throughout Putnam’s illustrious academic career is the balance between the twin 
ideals of freedom and equality. Or, put slightly different, between ‘respect for the indi-
vidual and concern for the community’ (Putnam, 2019: 2). Putnam’s career has been dedi-
cated to the analysis and understanding of this balance, largely through a focus on the 
concept of social capital.
Whether comparing the introduction of regional government in Italy (in Making 
Democracy Work, 1994), the decline of team sports in the United States (Bowling Alone, 
2000) or the evolution of social capital across a range of polities (Democracies in Flux, 
2002), Putnam’s work has always focused on how the potential tension between respect 
for the individual and concern for the community is managed in order to achieve a healthy 
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equilibrium. It is in exactly this context that The Upswing makes three core arguments. 
The first is that across a range of dimensions (economics, politics, society, culture, race 
and gender), the data suggest that the United States has lost any sense of balance and is, 
in effect, plumbing new depths when it comes to inequality, unfairness and individualism. 
The second argument is that the United States has been in this trough before in the Gilded 
Age from the 1870s to the early-twentieth century; and the final, undoubtedly hopeful, 
but also controversial argument is that because it has pulled itself out of a trough before 
it can do it again in the future, and therefore, escape its current crisis.
Crisis is, of course, a powerful description of any situation. It is also one that has hov-
ered, shadow-like, around almost any democratic discussion for much of the last 50 years. 
Democracy, it seems, exists in a perpetual swirl of crisis. Those readers who doubt this 
point might look back to the landmark report of the Trilateral Commission – The Crisis of 
Democracy – which caused such controversy at the mid-point of the second-half of the 
twentieth century (Crozier, 1975). And yet possibly, the biggest contribution of The 
Upswing is (paradoxically) its explication of just how divided the United States has 
become. To phrase this in terms of crisis is not hyperbole and it is important to note that 
the bulk of this book was written before the Trump Presidency and before the healthcare 
impact of the Coronavirus pandemic.
The scale of the American challenge is itself laid bare by Putnam in a series of histori-
cal charts which span the twentieth century and serve to illustrate that the ‘arc of the 
twentieth century’ is relatively clear, irrespective of specific social dimension or variable. 
The curve is one that starts from a very low base at the beginning of the century when 
individualism was high and concern for community low; it gradually climbs through the 
first-half of the century due to the achievements of the Progressive Era, peaking in the 
1960s; and then falls back into the trough at the end of the century as a combination of 
factors shift the balance back away from the ‘We’ to the ‘I’. The aim of setting out this 
curve is not to deny the existence of positive signs of social progress – throughout the 
twentieth century, houses got bigger, child mortality fell, car ownership increased, life 
expectancy rose, more people finished high school and graduated from college – but it is 
to highlight that even these positive trends mask underpinning increases in forms of ine-
quality which themselves reflect structurally embedded factors that too often appear 
resistant to change. But for Putnam, the ‘arc of the twentieth century’ tells a story not of 
disenchantment or decline but of recovery, revival, resurgence and the rebirth of a nation 
that recognised a need to temper the worst excesses of individualism and to use the state 
as a bulwark of positive social change. The key point that Putnam (2019: 19, emphasis in 
original) wants to make is that the United States has pulled itself out of similar situations 
in the past and it can do it again today:
And finally we turn to the implications of our findings for reformers today. For the arc we 
describe is not an arc of historical inevitability, but an arc constructed by human agency, just as 
Shakespeare suggested. Perhaps the single most important lesson we can hope to gain from this 
analysis is that in the past America has experienced a storm of unbridled individualism in our 
culture, our communities, our politics, and our economics, and it produced then, as it has today, 
a national situation that few Americans found appealing. But we successfully weathered that 
storm once, and we can do it again.
Whether the storm raging across the United States today is quite the same as the one that 
the architects of the Progressive Era faced is a point we will return to below but what this 
book does provide is a clear statistical sense of why the United States appears so deeply 
Flinders 5
divided. It also helps explain Trump’s entry to the apex of American politics and the attrac-
tiveness of Trump’ism to large sections of the American public. Trump’s brand of simplistic 
‘Us’ and ‘Them’/‘America First’ politics offered a clear emotional connection to those who 
felt the system was unfair, stacked against them and therefore that they had little to lose by 
taking an electoral risk (see Flinders, 2020). Put slightly different, Trump was not the prob-
lem and it is arguably more accurate to suggest that his rise to the presidency was simply 
symptomatic of a deeper social malady. It is the contours and curves of this malady – the 
loss of any sense of workable balance between respect for the individual and concern for the 
community – that Putnam maps out with such precision and clarity that forms the core con-
tribution of this book. This contribution is also possibly the book’s weakness in the sense 
that it tells the reader a huge amount about the problems with American life and society that 
were already largely well-known. Returning to de Tocqueville and the benefits of an out-
sider’s perspective, when viewed from this side of the Atlantic, it is difficult to think that 
anyone could have observed the threats and theatre of Trump’s America and not come to the 
conclusion that something was seriously wrong.
But problem-orientated analyses already exist aplenty – although admittedly not with 
the scale of statistical ambition and historical sweep contained within The Upswing – and 
what is needed given the depth of the contemporary trough that Putnam charts is exactly 
the more solution-orientated approach which is initially promised. How can the civic 
potential of modern America be unlocked? What does mending democracy in the United 
States actually mean in the twenty-first century? Where are the new narratives that need 
to be told or the novel forms of social glue that can bind American society? If history 
provides insights and lessons that can inspire a new upswing, then how can they be used 
to forge a fresh blueprint for national renewal? These are the questions that The Upswing 
so usefully provokes and which also demand that I sit to some extent ‘outside the whale’ 
in an Orwellian sense of foregoing the comforts and protection afforded by remaining 
within the dominant worldview of a specific tribe (Orwell, 1964 [1940]).
The dominant belief emerging from the collective consciousness of a vast number of 
reviewers is that ‘The Upswing is a masterpiece; it weaves seemingly unrelated stories 
into a grand master narrative of the last hundred years. A triumph’. Other reviews make 
similarly effusive claims and one could be forgiven for thinking that the brilliance of this 
book is what Elinor Ostrom (2000) once termed ‘a self-evident truth’, a common sense 
wisdom almost beyond discussion. To question or reject dominant assumptions, irrespec-
tive of their focus, is a risky endeavour; like the fish who leaves the shoal or the animal 
that strays from the pack, going it alone can be a dangerous path to take (far safer and 
easier never to stray from the path of conventional opinion). But as Ostrom (2000: 33) 
(herself a Nobel Prize winner) emphasised, the ‘danger of self-evident truths’ is ‘[T]the 
fact that something is widely believed does not make it correct’. With this in mind, it is 
necessary to state my position very clearly. The Upswing is a brilliant book that offers an 
unrivalled account of American social change. It intertwines disparate facts and demo-
graphic trends into a flowing and accessible narrative but it is far stronger in terms of 
explaining the past than it is about charting the future.
Outside the whale
Bob Putnam is proud of his Irish ancestry and has travelled around the island that is 
Ireland piecing together the fragments of his family tree. By travelling to the Emerald 
Isle, Putnam was, in essence, seeking to identify and understand his roots, and through 
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that to achieve a sense of stability and anchorage. This focus on the need for individuals 
to feel anchored could take us on an intellectual journey from Émile Durkheim’s work on 
social anomie, through to C. Wright Mills’ writing about alienation and ‘the trap’ of mod-
ern life, to Zygmunt Bauman’s work on liquidity and fear, right up to the 2020 work of 
Anne Case and Angus Deaton on ‘deaths of despair and the future of capitalism’. But 
such temptations must be resisted in order to make the simple point that individuals need, 
crave and are to a large degree dependent upon a sense of belonging within a broader 
social fabric. As that fabric becomes increasingly threadbare, then so people seek to either 
mend their sense of self or find new tribes to which they can belong.3 The phenomenal 
growth in the popularity of tracing family trees, finding long-lost relatives and even 
DNA-based ancestry testing is therefore just the soft relation of more extreme brand of 
neo-tribalism and ethno-nationalism that has emerged in recent years. It is all about roots 
and anchorage.
In essence, what The Upswing really reveals is that a phenomenal downswing vis-à-vis 
roots, anchorage and communitarian sentiment has occurred in the United States during 
the last half-century. The more positive reading of that trend comes from stepping back 
still further in history in order to suggest that similar challenges have been navigated in 
the past and, by implication, can be similarly addressed in the future. It is this implication 
or implicit assumption that places me ‘outside the whale’, in the sense of not being quite 
as convinced about the core thesis of the book as other readers. ‘[W]e should take inspira-
tion and perhaps instruction’ Putnam (2019: 18) argues ‘from a period of despair much 
like our own, on the heels of which Americans successfully – and measurably – bent his-
tory in a more promising direction [italics added]’.
Never before has the word ‘measurably’ been deployed with such constant and laser-
like precision. The Putnam approach is unashamedly positivist and therefore ‘what 
counts’ is apparently what can be measured, quantified and presented in charts and graphs. 
While the statistical meta-analyses are undoubtedly impressive, after a while, the book 
develops a repetitive style whereby chart after chart reveals the same ‘I’-‘We’-‘I’ arc 
which is at one and the same time, the single contribution of the book and also possibly 
its biggest weakness. Weakness because I could not help that there was something so 
obviously Procrustean about fitting the vast complexity and inevitable messiness of 
American life and society – from Honolulu to Houston and from Dallas to Deadhorse – 
within a strangely neat and consistent curve. ‘[T]oo often’ Idrees Kahloon suggests, 
‘Putnam and Garrett hammer these complex evolutions into a clean historic arc to better 
align with the argument of the rest of the book’.4 The evidence for this curve-shaped the-
sis is also problematic in places. For all, Putnam’s skills as a storyteller; there was also 
something somewhat deadening about the constant curves; an inability of the vast statis-
tical-scraping and ‘big-data’ to quite convey the real world relevance of the sweeping 
lines in terms of deeper tones and texture. Strangely enough, the more I read into The 
Upswing, the more I thought about and appreciated Arlie Hochschild’s (2016) Strangers 
in Their Own Land with its deep ethnographic insights and subtle emotional layering. (In 
many ways, the books are clearly complementary.)
A related point revolves around the scope of the argument. Although the historical 
sweep is as wide as it is ambitious, the territorial breadth of the book appears unnecessar-
ily narrow. As has already been mentioned, the ‘crisis of democracy’ which has in recent 
decades formed the focus of a burgeoning literature is by no means limited to the United 
States. Many of the social and economic challenges captured in the vast body of data 
presented in this book are pressing issues in many parts of the world. As the work of 
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Gábor Scheiring et al. (2020) has revealed, for example, ‘deaths of despair’ represent a 
social pathology increasingly found across Europe (and which are also expected to 
increase in a post-COVID context). And yet, this book exists within a cocoon of implied 
American exceptionalism. It is as if the rest of the world does not exist. Putnam may well 
respond that all books have boundaries and that this is a book about the United States 
Period.
The deeper tension within this book, however, arguably stems less from its territorial 
boundaries, statistical sources or methodological approach but more from its core assump-
tion that history provides lessons for the future. In many ways, there is a triple-dimension 
to this normative foundation. The first assumption is that the Progressive era impulses 
towards greater togetherness were really a solution to deep social challenges (rather than 
potentially simply sowing the seeds of later disruptive forces). The second assumption is 
that understanding the late-nineteenth, early twentieth-century upswing will provide 
insights that can be used to inform, promote and nurture a new upswing in the twenty-first 
century (i.e. an information-based assumption). The third assumption is that because the 
United States has lifted itself up before then it can do it again (i.e. an action-based 
assumption). This is feel good political science. At times, the text possesses an Obama-
esque ‘Yes, we can!’ energy which arguably flounders and crashes on the shore of politics 
because it is based on the assumption that there are similarities between the challenges of 
the late-nineteenth century and those that the United States faces in the early–twenty-first 
century.
At face value, a thematic approach to the challenges – economics, politics, society, 
culture, race and gender as adopted in this book – will undoubtedly present a certain sense 
of similarity. And yet, I am less convinced that the insights from the past (particularly 
around ‘The Great Convergence’ of the mid-twentieth century) will actually offer as 
many useful lessons about thinking about the future as Putnam seems to suggest. Two 
explanations – the first historical, the second comparative – exist for this sense of con-
cern, while also serving to dissect Putnam’s assumptions.
From a historical perspective, it is possible to suggest that Putnam adopts a rather rosy 
interpretation of American mid-twentieth century life. The ‘coming togetherness’ which 
is described in such a sweeping style possibly underplays the extent of racial separation 
and discrimination at the peak of the ‘we’, it arguably glosses over limited progress in 
relation to sexual orientation and gay rights, and might have highlighted more clearly 
how women were implicitly and explicitly assigned to ‘homemaker’ roles within a sharply 
defined family unit. Indeed, a sharper focus on how some of the Progressive era prescrip-
tions served to fuel a subsequent social splintering would have deepened the level of 
analysis. The obvious reference point for this argument is Alan Abramowitz’s (2018) The 
Great Alignment: Race, Party Transformation and the Rise of Donald Trump which sug-
gests, with a similarly data-heavy approach, that some of the United States’ contemporary 
challenges may in fact have their roots in elements of the New Deal coalition. At a more 
basic and comparative level, it is also possible to ask whether comparing across the cen-
tury from t1 (trough‘I’) to t2 (peak/‘we’) through to t3 (trough/‘I’) – as an economist 
might frame it – seems slightly too stretched, too simplistic. Just consider the scale of the 
scientific and technological transformations that have occurred in recent decades, not to 
mention the explosion in global flows when it comes to knowledge, money and people. 
The liquid modern here and now – to paraphrase Zygmunt Bauman – may in fact have 
little to learn from times that were far more solid and stable. It is railroads in a time of 
8 Political Studies Review 00(0)
information super highways. Pitchforks in the time of Twitter mobs. Air balloons in the 
time of space travel. Tea parties in the shadow of the Tea Party.
Even if the information-based assumptions were correct and a close reading of 
American history did provide insights and clues to forging a new blueprint for civic 
decline the action-orientated assumptions would still have to be proved correct. 
Opportunity is not action. What has past is not always prologue, as Putnam suggests, it 
might just be the past.
The great paradox of The Upswing is that it arguably manages to leave the reader with 
the impression that the author is himself unsure as to the extent to which history really 
matters.5 Put slightly different, the The Upswing fulfils only half of its sub-title; it pro-
vides an unrivalled account of how the United States ‘came together a century ago’, but 
is far less developed or confident when it comes to explaining ‘how we can do it again’. 
This is reflected in both the structure and content of the book. The vast bulk of the content 
is problem-orientated with a data-driven focus on the up-and-down of the arc through six 
thematic lenses covering almost 300 pages. By the time the reader has ploughed through 
the statistical analyses and historical narrative, they are certainly well-versed in the scale 
and complexity of the challenge. They are also well primed to understand exactly what 
this understanding of the past has for plotting the future and achieving the eponymous 
Upswing.
‘Just how all Americans might work together to engineer another upswing is the final 
question this book takes on’ (p. 314). And yet, having outlined the arc of the twentieth 
century, the final prescriptive chapter on ‘Drift and Mastery’ is incredibly thin, almost 
porous. The gap between what was promised and what was arguably delivered is to some 
extent made physical by the manner in which the concluding notes and acknowledge-
ments stretch across over 100 pages, while the future-focused conclusion limps to cover 
less than 30:6
Though their initial goals were not always clear or coherent, Progressives had two things in 
common – a compelling desire to repudiate the downward drift of our nation, and a galvanizing 
belief in the power of ordinary citizens to do so. In their diverse stories – more so than their 
specific politics, policies or programs – we may find a blueprint for how to create a similar 
turning point today. (p. 319)
The Progressives who raised the United States out of the trough of the Gilded Age may 
well have had two things in common (i.e. ‘a compelling desire’ and ‘a galvanizing belief’) 
and through studying them, we ‘may’ find a blueprint but a counter-thesis might adopt a 
less optimistic set of assumptions. What Putnam arguably identifies are a set of histori-
cally specific social trends that occurred at a very different historical point and in a very 
different socio-political context to the United States of today. A context, that is, in which 
the ‘YOYO economy’ (i.e. ‘You’re on your own’) is fuelled by the precarity of those who 
exist in a fragile hinterland of insecure employment, and who pay the price for ‘the great 
risk shift’ (see Hacker, 2019). As anyone who has watched I, Daniel Blake will know, 
there is a world of difference between individualism as a value preference and individual-
ism because there is no alternative.7 The final chapter’s sub-headings – ‘From Privilege 
to Passion’, ‘Isolation to Association’, ‘From Darkness to Light’, and so on – do little to 
veil what often appears as a somewhat quaint and nostalgic view of middle-class benevo-
lence combined with an apple-pie account of the American dream. That is not to suggest 
that the social impact of the creation of Rotary Clubs or campaigning bodies like the 
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NAACP has not been significant, nor to dismiss the bravery of those ‘muckrakers’ (such 
as Upton Sinclair, Jacob Riis, Ida Wells, Ida Tarbell, Florence Kelley, Ray Stannard 
Baker, Lincoln Steffens and John Spargo) who during those decades that spanned the turn 
of the twentieth century used their journalism and risked their lives to expose the exist-
ence of exploitation. Nor is it to overlook the ‘rags to riches’ rise of some robber barons 
and their transition into great philanthropists. But it is to suggest that such historical 
insights were themselves embedded in a very different political culture when the social 
anchorage points were at least far more secure, the forces of globalisation less rapacious, 
the capacity of nation states to lever change far greater.
Putnam’s almost unbridled optimism may well fuel the book but can its belief that the 
early indicators of a powerful civic revival can be identified really be true, especially in 
the post-Trump era? The depths of the trough that the United States finds itself in have 
only deepened in the time since Putnam (2019: 328) delivered this book to the publisher 
and yet, he argues, ‘[T]oday we are seeing a similar drive to uncover corruption, expose 
exploitation, and lay bare the dark underbelly of the “I” society in which we now live’. It 
is almost impossible not to wonder what Putnam thought about the chances of an upswing 
as he watched the Trump-incited armed crowds storm the Capitol Building in January 
2021, just as his book was rolling off the printer’s press. It is Putnam’s conviction that a 
positive civic resurgence is emerging in the United States which just seems to grate 
against the recent realities of American life. This is a book that finds cause for optimism 
in the unlikeliest of places. In the student gun control activism, for example, that arose in 
the aftermath of the 2018 Stoneman Douglas High School shooting in Florida but is it 
really possible to identify any major progress in relation to gun control?8
Putnam (2019: 331) is not naïve. He acknowledges that ‘Certainly neither the prolif-
eration of high schools nor the reinvigoration of fraternal organizations is the solution to 
today’s problems’. And yet, many of the elements that are identified from history as nec-
essary to move from the dip of the ‘I’ to the peak of the ‘we’ – ‘a new narrative’, ‘a 
broader vision’, ‘local innovations bubbling up from below’, ‘young change-makers’, ‘a 
more fruitful national conversation’, ‘recognising the latent power of collective action’, 
‘build the foundations of a reimagined America’ and ultimately, ‘a retraining and retool-
ing of average Americans for active citizenship’ – are hardly novel. If anything, they are 
the political equivalent of apple-pie, motherhood, clean water and breastfeeding in the 
sense that at one level, they are pretty hard to argue against; a wish list in which idealism 
could be seen to be trumping realism. But where Putnam’s analysis really falls down is in 
relation to any detailed account of how to nurture the changes in civic life that so clearly 
need to happen, and to which he has dedicated his illustrious career to tracking.
Inside the barrel
Robert Putnam is far more than an academic. He is an innovator, an activist and an adviser 
to presidents and publics alike. The New York Times (4 March 2015) was therefore correct 
when it wrote that ‘Robert D. Putnam is technically a Harvard social scientist, but a better 
description might be poet laureate of civil society’. His work speaks to a broad national 
audience in a language they can understand and often manages to capture the existence of 
a changing emotional landscape. Just as Putnam (2019; 1) acknowledges that de 
Tocqueville delivered insights and arguments ‘that only an outsider’s perspective could 
yield’, it might also be true that those based beyond the United States and looking at The 
Upswing from the outside will yield a very different account of both the strengths and 
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weakness of this book. In this regard, my position has been clear: The Upswing is a mag-
nificent book but it tells readers far more about the past (‘how [America] came together a 
century ago’) than it does about the future (‘how [it] can do it again’). This critique may 
well place me in an uncomfortable position ‘outside the whale’ when set against the rave 
reviews this book has so far engendered. And yet, it is exactly this position, this sense of 
distance and perspective, which may allow me to place this book within its own historical 
context in a way that dovetails with and deepens my critique of its information-based and 
action-orientated assumptions. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to move from being 
‘outside the whale’ to understanding what it is like to be ‘in the barrel’.
This shift in focus reveals the existence of two inter-related dimensions which each in 
their own ways are critical to comprehending, cultivating or criticising the potential for 
either an upswing or downswing. The first relates to the core explicit dimension that 
winds its way through Putnam’s book – the balance between respect for the individual 
and concern for the community. The second is a dimension that lurks beneath and within 
every page and chapter, paragraph and sentence, and concerns the balance between ideal-
ism and realism.9 It is this latter dimension that possibly explains my estrangement from 
Putnam’s thesis: it is possibly too heavy on the idealism and too light on the realism. The 
book begins by acknowledging the scale of the challenge. ‘Public debates are character-
ized not by deliberation but by demonization of those on the opposing side . . . [A] rising 
tide of populism has captured the enthusiasm of many, especially in rural areas. America’s 
democratic institutions strain under the burden of polarization’ (p. 6). But such gritty real-
ism seems a distant land to the sweeping strokes concerning ‘new narratives’, ‘sweeping 
visions’ and ‘local innovations’ that are deployed to discuss the future in the concluding 
chapter.
Bringing the history back in, there is a sense that The Upswing might be a book that 
has missed its moment. If there was an opportunity when a constellation of factors – ‘a 
compelling desire’ and ‘a galvanizing belief’ – seemed aligned to deliver exactly the 
renewal of American civic life that Putnam promotes, then surely it came in 2008 with the 
election of Barack Obama on a veritable tidal wave of expectations. And yet, Obama’s 
presidency is not discussed. The United States’ first Black president receives just two 
fleeting mentions (pp. 55 and 86). The lack of even the most basic discussion about the 
successes and failure of the Obama presidency in terms if not of delivering an uplift then 
at least in possibly flattening-out the curve is a striking omission for a book based on an 
understanding of history. If Obama failed to stem the downwards decline, which notwith-
standing his undoubted social policy success and economic interventions he did fail to do, 
then what does that tell us about democratic decline and the politics of the upswing?
The answers to this question could undoubtedly form the basis of several books but a 
close reading of Obama’s memoirs sets Putnam’s hopeful thesis within a dark shadow.10 
Obama promoted ‘the audacity of hope’, there was a compelling desire and a galvanising 
belief in the need for change across vast sections of American society but George Packer 
(2020) is correct to see A Promised Land as ‘an exercise in ironic realism’; the scale of 
the challenges which Obama faced overwhelmed him. Getting things done. Making 
democracy work. Driving change was almost impossible. The White House was full of 
rubber-levers and levering change was a Herculean endeavour given the gridlocked and 
labyrinthine governmental machine. The magnitude, complexity and scale of the chal-
lenges facing American society – and therefore, fundamental to achieving an upswing – 
are set out in Obama’s memoirs with an almost resentful viciousness that stands in stark 
contrast to Putman’s prescriptions. Obama was an astute political entrepreneur who 
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sought to translate the popular uprising of anger and belief that carried him into office into 
policies and programmes. He leaned upon seasoned reformers and experienced operators 
to staff his administration. And yet, the tortuous and tangled machine politics on Capitol 
Hill ensured that any ambition and ‘get-up-and-go’ was gradually suffocated at every turn 
by the constant process of complex bargaining, back-slapping and brinkmanship needed 
to see proposals get turned into law. ‘At times, I felt like the fisherman in Hemingway’s 
The Old Man and the Sea’ Obama notes ‘sharks gnawing at my catch as I tried to tow it 
to shore’ (Obama, 2020: 555).
For most of his early years in office, when he was closest to the groundswell of agita-
tion and youth-driven energy that propelled him into office, it is possible to suggest that 
Obama, the outwardly confident Obama – Hawaiian cool complete with superman cape, 
immortalised in Shepard Fairey’s graphic art poster – was, in fact ‘not waving, but 
drowning’.11 The demonisation he faced, the wave-after-wave of crises, the media intru-
sion, the unrealistic expectations, the amplification of failures, fever-pitched partisan-
ship, the denial of success, embedded institution inertia, polarized politics, layered 
inequalities . . . left him describing presidential life as like being ‘inside the barrel’. ‘[L]
like the daredevils and fools of old at Niagara Falls – you find yourself trapped in the 
proverbial barrel and disorientated’ Obama (2020: 519) writes, ‘no longer sure which 
way is up, powerless to arrest your descent, waiting to hit bottom and hoping, without 
evidence, that you’ll survive the impact’. It is exactly this sense of the everyday lived 
experience of being in American politics that The Upswing seems too distant from. It is 
also this notion of being ‘in the barrel’ which leads me to suggest that the challenge of 
getting the United States out of its current trough bears little resemblance to similar his-
torical periods. Recapturing the ‘we’ will be harder than Putnam suggests because the 
storm that currently embraces the United States is very different to anything it has ever 
weathered in the past.
I hope, however, that Putnam’s positivity proves me wrong.
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Notes
 1. See, for example, Keane J (2010); Runciman D (2019); de Chosal CB (2017); Levitsky S and Ziblatt D; 
Diamon L, Plattner MF and Rice C (2015); Goldberg J (2020); Corfe R (2018); Przeworski A (2018); 
Roberts A (2017); Mettler S and Lieberman R (2020); Applebaum A (2020).
 2. A good example being Putnam’s Better Together: Restoring the American Community which is both a 
book and website published as an initiative of the Saguaro Seminar conducted at Harvard University’s 
John F. Kennedy School of Government. The initiative is aimed at facilitating rapid and extensive com-
munity development, particularly within the United States and uses a book with the same title by Robert 
Putnam and Lewis M. Feldstein as its primary reference text. See https://www.hks.harvard.edu/
 3. For a novel and quite exquisite analysis of this process, see Hendriks et al. (2020).
 4. Kahloon op cit. 2000.
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 5. Colin Kidd notes that Putnam and Garrett ‘try to be upbeat, but the dominant tone is wistful’. See ‘The 
Upswing – can Biden heal America?’ The Guardian, 12 November 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/
books/2020/nov/12/the-upswing-review-can-biden-heal-america
 6. ‘Putnam’s last chapter, addressing lessons from the past on how we might reclaim a more trusting, com-
munity- minded America, is abbreviated, elevated and a little wishful’ (Robert Kuttner, 2020).
 7. I, Daniel Blake is a 2016 drama film directed by Ken Loach and written by his long-time collaborator Paul 
Laverty. It stars Dave Johns as Daniel Blake, who is denied Employment and Support Allowance despite 
his doctor finding him unfit to work. Blake struggles to navigate an on-line and alienating benefits system. 
The line ‘I am not a blip on a computer screen or a national insurance number, I am a man’ captures the 
social frustration and sense of anomie that many social studies have identified among sections of the pub-
lic who feel forgotten or ‘left behind’.
 8. For a less positive but possibly more realistic analysis, see the second chapter of Dowding’s (2020).
 9. Eric Kaufman identifies a third trade-off dimension which he suggests is under-acknowledged within The 
Upswing – between diversity and solidarity, which chimes with Putnam’s earlier work on ‘bridging’ and 
‘bonding’. See Kaufman (2020).
10. For a detailed review of Obama’s memoirs, see Matthew Flinders (2021).
11. ‘Not Waving, But Drowning’ is the title of a well-known poem by Stevie Smith, first published in 1957, 
with a strong allegorical message about people who may on the outside appear to be happy on strong, 
while on the inside feeling weak, lost and in trouble. Available at: https://www.poetryfoundation.org/
poems/46479/not-waving-but-drowning
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